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Tax policies have  contributed relatively little to Korea's extraor-
dinary growth: less than 10 percent of Korean growth between
1962 and 1982, and about 3 percent of export growth.  Indirect
tax exemptions (rebates of sales and excise taxes on exports)
have contributed far more to growth than have direct measures
(mainly corporate tax rebates for exporters).
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Trcla and Whalley use an apolied general  DU  ring the period of Korea's extraordinary
cquilibrium model to investigate die conitribution  growth since the early 1960s, tax policy has been
of ouward-oriented policies to thc earlier years  used to promote changing economic objectives
of Korean growth.  in diffcrent ways.
They conclude:  One should look beyond tax  In the outward-oriented phase of economic
policy for the main factors underlying strong  expansion (1961-72), rebates of direct and
Korean grow.  th.  Tax policy accounts for 6.2 to  indirect taxes on exports were used to cncourage
7.9 percent of Korean growth betwcen 1962 and  growth.
1982, and only' 6.7 percent between 1962 and
1972. Tax policy in Korea has accommodated  In thc second phase, when Korea was
high growth in Korea rather thani  drivcn it.  promoting the growth of hcavy industry (steel
and clhcmicals),  investment tax credits, tax
Indirect tax cxemptions (rcbates of sales and  holidays, and other tax incentives were used to
cxcise taxes on exports) have conitributed  far  facilitate sector-specific capital accumulation.
more to Korea's growth than have direct mea-
sures (mainly corporate tax rcbates for export-  In thc most recent trade liberalization and
crs).  But nontax mcasures (tariff rebales. interest  structural adjustment phase (1980-89), the
preferences, direct cash subsidies, and export  revenuc-raising potential of the value-added tax
premia) have played an even greater part in  has played an important part in thc move toward
Korea's developmeilt process.  policy neutralitv.
Hiigh  savings rates (alniost 38 percent of  Mean growth rates have remained high in
GDP in 1988) and hiigh  investment rates have  cach phase, and have seemcd to be resilient in
becn cenltral  to Korean groA  th performance. So  thc facc of frequent policy changes.  In 1989,
have significant transfers of labor from rural to  however, the growth rate fcll sharply, export
urban sectors, especially in the early phases of  growth was negative, and there was talk of - cw
growth.  Export promotion policies, which  "economic crisis."
stimulate manufacturing, moved labor Irom the
low-efficiency rural sector to dhe  high-efficicncy  Despite thesc changes in tax policy, Korean
urban sector.  growth has consistently achieved high lcvels
since the early 1960s.
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While  the  literature  that  attempts  to  explain  growth  performance
in Korea and other  Asian  NIC's  has grown  in recent  years,,  little  of  it
has  explicitly  examined  the  role  of taxes  in the  growth  process. Moreover,
literature  on Korean tax policy has merely documented  changes in tax
structure  as growth  has occurred 2 and  made illustrative  calculations  on
such issues  as the impact  of taxes  on the cost  of capital,  and  has failed
to evaluate  the role  of tax  policies  in the  growth  process. Capturing  all
the elements underlying  Korean growth performance  (high savings  rates,
human capital accumulation,  intersectoral  resource  shifts) in a  single
model is difficult  and is  well beyond  current  capabilities.  Nonetheless,
given  the current  state  of the literature,  we believe  that some  modelling
evaluation  of the  contribution  of tax  policy  to  growth  in  Korea  can  be done
and is  useful.
In this  paper,  we use  an applied  general  equilibrium  model  that  we
have  used  earlier  (Trela  and Whalley  (1989)) to  investigate  the
contribution  of outward  oriented  policies  to the earlier  years of Korean
growth, through induced  intersectoral  resource  transfers  and impacts  on
effort  and  labor  supply  in  agriculture  and  manufacturing  sectors. While  we
have  only  focused  on  one  aspect  of the  Korean  growth  experience,  what seems
to emerge  from the  model calculations  is that one should  look beyond  tax
policy for the main factors underlying strong Korean growth.  Model
calculations  portray the tax component  of outward oriented  policies  as
/1  See  Chonery et  al.  (1986).
I/  See  World  Bank  (1987a),  Choi  (1988)  and  Kim (1988).-2
accounting  for  6.2 to 7.9  percent  of Korean  growth  between  1962  and 1982,
and only  6.7 percent  between  1962  and 1972.  This conclusion  mirrors  what
we portray  as the  robustness  of  Korean  growth  performance  to  various  policy
regime  switches,  including  tax policy.  High savings  rates (amounting  to
almost  38 percent  of GDP in 1988)3  and high investment  rates  have been
central  to the  Korean  growth  performance,  as  have significant  transfers  of
labor from rural to urban sectors, especially  in the early phases of
growth. What  we suggest,  therefore,  is that  tax  policy  in Korea  should  be
seen as accommodating  high growth  in Korea,  rather  than being one of the
key factors  driving  it.
We also  emphasize  how, in  Korea's  extraordinary  growth  performance
since  the early  1960s,  tax  policy  has  been used in several  different  ways
to meet the economic objectives of the tim . First, in the outward
oriented  phase  of economic  expansion  (1961-72),  direct  and indirect  rebate
and exemption  schemes  for exporters  were used to encourage  high growth.
Then, in the second  phase  when the growth  of heavy industry  (steel  and
chemicals)  was being  promoted,  the  tax  system  was  used  to facilitate  sector
specific  capital  accumulation. Subsequently,  in the most recent  growth
phase (1979  onwards),  the revenue  raising  potential  of the  VAT has played
an important  part  in the  move towards  policy  neutrality.  Mean  growth  rates
have remained  high in  each  phase,  and  have seemed  to be resilient  to these
frequent  switches  in policy. However,in  1989  there  has been a sharp  fall
in the  growth  rate,  export  growth  has  been  negative  and  there  has  been  talk
of a  new "econoaic  crisis".
3/  See  Park  (1989),  Table  3.-3-
II.  TAXES.  OUTWARD  ORIENTATION AND GROWTH  IN  KOREA - THE RECORD
The existing  literature  attributes  the  success  of  Korea's  economic
growth in large part to the policy shift in the  1960s from import
substitution  to  export  promotion. 4 This  is  not  to say  that  Korea's  growth
rates  can be explained  solely  by changes  in trade  policy.  In fact,  the
policy structure  in Korea is substantially  more complex  than this, and
there have been three distinct regime switches  since the early 196c(s.
Growth  in Korea  has  also  been  more  volatile  than  in other  Asian  NICs,  such
as Taiwan  and Hong Kong,  with prolonged  periods  of extraordinarily  rapid
growth  followed  by years in which growth  rates  have been zero and even
negative.
The  mean growth  rate in Korea  over  the  period  from 1961  to 1986,
has  been  very high--around  8.3  percent--but  there  have  been repeated  major
and  dramatic  policy  changes  following  perceived  crisis  as in 1973  and  1979.
Policy from 1961 through  to 1972  was markedly  characterized  by outward
orientation,  involving  duty  remissions,  tax  rebates  on  exports,
registration  schemes  for importers  and other  elements  of policy  tied to
export  performance.  This  was followed  by a  period  between  1973  and 1979  in
which development  of heavy and chemical  industries,  including  iron and
steel,  non-ferrous  metals,  ship  building,  general  machinery,  chemicals  and
electronics,  was stressed  while many earlier  export  performance  policies
and tax holidays  and other outward  oriented  incentives  used for targeted
41  For some  useful  Interpretive  essays  and research  studies  on the proximate  causes  of
success, see Brown (1973),  Hasan and Rao (1979),  Kruger (1979),  Kwack (1988)  and
Scitovsky  (1985).  Opposing  the conclusions  from these  atuiles  are the results  from
Chenery et al. (1986),  Table 11-3,  which seems to i%,Bcate  that outward  oriented
policies  have  been  relatively  unimportant  to  Korean  grovti.-4-
industries  were withdrawn.  Since 1980,  policies  have focused  instead  on
structural adjustment  and trade liberalization,  with a  pronounced  move
towards  neutrality  in  policy  and  the  removal  of  most existing  incentives.
Growth  in  Korea  has  been  remarkably  resilient  to these  switches  in
tax regime and policy.  Taxes played their role in the early outward
oriented  strategy  through  the  rebating  of cascading  sales  and  excise  taxes,
and the rebating  of a portion  of cnrpcrate  taxes to export  industries.
However,  as protection  has been reduced  in the trade liberalization  and
3tructural  adjustment  phase,  so duty remissions  have become  progressively
less important. Furthermore,  a number  of the  tax  rebate  schemes  linked  to
exports have been eliminated  over the last 10 to 15 years. 5 In the
process,  the  Korean  tax  system  has  matured  from  a relatively  narrowly  based
system, focused  on traditional  excisables,  trade and other taxes,  to a
system with a broadly based value added tax that accounzs  for a  major
portion  of revenues,  along  with income  and  corporate  taxes  with much  wider
coverage  and  more  sophisticated administration than  in most other
developing  countries.6
A.  Growth  Performance  and  Korean  Policy  Regimes
Korea achieved an 8.3 percent annual rate of real GNP growth
between 1961 and 1986.  This was among the highest in the world and
contrasts  with an annual  growth  rate of approximately  four  percent  in the
preceding  1954-60  period.  Korea effectively  transformed  itself  from an
underdeveloped  predominantly  agricultural  economy to a  prominent  newly
Industrialized  country  (NIC).
i/  See  the  discussion  later  In  Section  2.
J/  See  the  discussion  in  Ban  (1986).-5-
During the post-Korean  Wa. reconstruction  period,  from 1954-60,
policy  in  Korea  had  been  basically  inward  looking,  with import  substitution
through  tariffs  and  quotas  for  light  manufactured  and  non-durable  consumer
goods. The  government  made some  efforts  to promote  exports 7 but,  although
exporta  grew,  they  remained  small,  ranging  from  2.2  percent  to 4.1  percent
of  GNP.
The 1960.  saw  major changes  in policy  moves away from an inward
looking, import substituting towards an outward oriented development
strategy.  A  comprehensive export promotion scheme was  introduced,
involving  a  range  of incentives:  preferential  credit  for  exportsl  indirect
tax exemptions on inputs for export production and export sales; a
reduction of corporate and  income taxes on export earningst  wa3tage
allowsnces  on imported  raw materials  for export  production;  accelerated
depreciation  allowances  for  fixed capital directly used  in export
production; foreign loan guarantees;  and import and export financing
assistance. Import  controls  were liberalized  so that entrepreneurs  could
import machinery  and  equipment  free of tariffs for use  in export
production. Foreign  loans  were encouraged  to fill  the  domestic  savings  gap
and, with the devaluation  of the Korean  won in 1964 and interest  rate
reforms  in 1965,  interest  rates  on ordinary  loans  from  banking  institutions
were substantially  raised. As a  result,  bank deposits  increased  rapidly,
enlarging  the  supply  of  loanable  funds  to  Korean  exporters.
7V  These included  provisions  for converting  export  earniAgs  into  foreign  exchange
certificates that mere  traded at a premium in a  free market.  Moreover, the
export/import  link  system  entitled  holders  of  foreign  exchange  certificat  e  to iMport
certain  popular  (luxury)  items  whlch  were  not otherwlse  available.  Direct  subsidies  on
exports and preferential  interest rates  on loans for export  activities  were used,
although  not  extensively.  See  Westphal  and  Kim (1977),  pp. 1-2  - 1-3.The success of Korea's economic  growth  is often attributed  in
large  part to these  outward  oriented  policies. As can be seen  from  Table
1, exports  grew rapidly,  reflecting  major expansion  in the production  of
labor  intensive  manufactures  (textiles,  apparel,  plywood  and footwear)  in
which  exporters were  believed  at  this time to have a  significant
comparative  advantage.  The  annual  growth  rate  of  exports  in volume  terms
was  about  30 percent  between  1961  and 1972,  and  real  GNP  grew  at an annual
rate of 8.2 percent.  The manufacturing  sector  was the dominant  force  in
this  export  growth;  manufactured  exports  were 18.2  percent  of total  exports
in 1961  but  reached  88  percent  by 1972.
The expansion of manufacturing  in domestic  product (from 8.9
percent  in 1961  to 20 percent  in 1972)8 also induced  a shift  in the  labor
force from agriculture  and other primary industries,  where output  per
worker  was low,  to  manufacturing  and  other  activities,  where it  was  higher.
Table 2 indicates that 63.1 percent of the working population  was in
agriculture  in 1963.  This  proportion  steadily  declined  to 50.6  percent  by
1972.  The  percentage  of workers  employed  in manufacturing  increased  from
8.7  percent  in 1963  to 14.2  in 1972;  total  employment  increased  by about  38
percent  between  1963 and 1972.  Hence,  the expansion  of non-agricultural
employment  was  achieved  both  by sectoral  shifts  of labor  and  by an increase
in total employment.  The share of employment  in the social  overhead
-apital  and service  sectors  also increased  from 28.2 percent  in 1963 to
35.2  percent  in 1972.
In the  early 1970s,  the government  began to change  the direction
of policy  away from  general  export  promotion  to  irds sectoral  development,
focusing  on heavy and chemical  industries  (HCI).  This change  in policy
Al  This  data  ia  Era,  the  Economic Planning  Board  (1982),  Table  3-15d.-7-
TABLE 1
MAJOR ECONOMIC  INDICATORS  OF KOREAN  GROWTL, 1955-1986
(Unit:  US-$ and %)
Per  Growth  nflation  Gross fixed  National  Grz-rvh  Exports  Manufacttring
capita  rate  rate (GNP  investnent  saving  rate of  to  Exports to
GNP  of GNP  deflator)  to GNP  to GNP  exp.4ts  GNP  Tot  Exports
(1975  Ratio  Ratio
Constant
Won)
55  65  4.1  62.1  10.2  5.2  22.1  2.9  -
66  -1.4  34.0  10.3  -1.9  -9.0  2.3  -
74  7.6  22.2  10.6  5.5  33.9  2.2  -
80  5.5  -1.3  10.2  4.9  24.6  2.8  -
81  3.8  1.3  11.0  4.2  15.0  3.4  -
79  1.1  11.7  10.8  0.8  20.8  4.1  -
82  5.6  14.0  11.7  2.9  38.7  6.3  18.2
87  2.2  18.4  13.7  3.2  13.0  6.0  27.0
100  9.1  29.3  13.5  8.7  9.0  5.4  51.7
103  9.6  30.0  11.3  8.7  23.5  6.7  51.6
105  5.8  6.2  14.8  7.4  35.9  9.5  62.3
125  12.7  14.5  20.2  11.8  42.4  11.9  62.4
142  6.6  15.6  21.4  11.4  32.7  13.6  70.0
169  11.3  16.1  25.0  15.1  39.5  14.7  77.3
210  13.8  14.8  25.8  18.8  36.1  15.4  79.0
;70  252  7.6  15.6  24.7  16.2  19.6  15.0  83.6
/1  288  9.1  12.9  22.5  14.5  21.1  16.1  86.0
318  5.3  16.3  20.4  15.7  36.0  20.6  87.7
395  14.0  12.1  23.2  21.4  53.0  30.0  88.2
540  8.5  30.4  25.6  19.3  -0.8  28.4  90.2
590  6.8  24.6  25.3  16.8  19.0  28.2  88.3
797  13.4  21.0  24.4  22.2  41.5  32.0  89.8
1008  10.7  15.9  27.3  25.4  23.3  32.7  87.5
1392  11.0  21.6  31.3  .7.3  12.5  30.6  89.9
1640  7.0  20.0  33.2  26.5  -1.1  27.7  90.1
1589  -4.8  25.3  32.3  20.8  10.2  34.4  92.3
1  1719  6.6  15.4  28.7  20.5  15.0  37.8  92.9
1773  5.4  6.7  30.5  20.9  6.5  36.9  93.7
1914  11.9  3.9  31.3  25.3  15.5  37.5  94.4
2044  8.4  3.8  31.3  27.9  10.0  38.7  95.0
2047  5.4  4.1  30.8  28.6  2.1  37.7  95.4
2300  12.3  2.7  31.4  32.6  26.5  42.5  94.6
not available
ource:  Choi (1988), Table II-I;  Economic Planning Board (1976); Economic Planning
Board (1988).TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT  AND LABOUR PRODUCIIVITY IN KOREA BY SECTOR,  1963-86
Production  Per Worker
Employment  (1975  Constant  Thousand  Won)
Social  Social
Employed  Agriculture,  Mining  Overhead  Agriculture,  Mining  Overhead
Population  Forestry,  and  Capital  and  Forestry,  and  Capital  and
(thousand  and Fishery  Manufacturing  Others  and Fishery  Manufacturing  Others
person)  (%a)  (%a)  (  a
1963  7662  63.1  8.7  28.2
1964  7799  61.9  8.8  29.3
1965  8206  58.6  10.3  31.0
1966  8423  57.9  10.8  31.3  432  1902  692
1967  8717  55.2  12.8  32.0
1968  9155  52.4  14.0  33.6
1969  9414  51.3  14.3  34.4
1970  9745  50.4  14.3  35.2  541  3110  1041
1971  10066  48.4  14.2  37.4
1972  10559  50.9  14.2  35.2
1973  11139  .).0  16.3  33.7
1974  11586  48.2  17.8  34.0
1975  11830  45.9  19.1  35.0  658  4589  1851
1976  12556  44.6  21.8  33.5
1977  12929  41.8  22.4  35.8
1978  13490  38.4  23.2  38.4
1979  13664  35.8  23.7  40.5
1980  13706  34.0  22.6  43.4  731  9190  4667
1981  14048  34.2  21.3  44.5
1982  14424  32.1  21.9  46.1
1983  14515  29.7  23.3  47.0
1984  14417  27.1  24.2  48.7
1985  14935  24.9  24.5  50.6
1986  15505  23.6  25.9  50.0
Note:  a Percent  of total employed  population
Sources:  Economic  Planning  Board (1982,  1986, 1988)  and Kim (1988).-9-
reflected  sevyeral  factors. Among  them  were  rising  relative  labor  costs  and
concerns  over  slower growth  in traditional labor  intensive export
industries;  rising import  barriers  in developed  countries  against labor
intensive  manufactures;  and the desire  to develop  domestic  production  of
intermediate  inputs to supply the earlier export industries. 9 This
sectoral  growth  drive  was supported  by a wide range  of measures  including
import  protection  for  infant  industries,  industry  specific  tax  preferences
and credit  rationing.  Targeted  industries  ir this sectoral  growth  drive
included  steel,  metal products,  chemicals,  ship building,  machinery  and
auto  production.
Under this new policy, light industry  saw its share of gross
output  fall  between  1975  and 1980  (Table  3).  Heavy  industry,  on the  other
hand,  saw  its  share  almost  double  between  1970  and  1975  and  rise  further  by
1980. The  share  of  manufacturing  in  production  i,tc)eased  further  from  40.3
percent  in  1970 to 51.0 percent in 1980.  The  HCI promotion also
contribuited  to an  upgrading  in exports,  the share  of HCI  products  in total
exports increasing  from 21.3 percent  in 1972 to 38.3 percent  by 1980.10
The  share  of agriculture  in  production  continued  to decline  from  17  percent
in 1970  to  8.3  percent  in 1980.
Large  investments  in  the  targeted  HCI industries,  however,  created
several  adverse  effects  during  this  period,  including  (allegedly)  excessive
real  vage increases  in these  industries,  insufficient  investment  in light
industries  and  capital  market  distortions. The  goverrnment  response  was to
deign a Comprehensive  Stabilization  Program in mid-1979 that included
9/  See  Kwack  (1986),  pp.  76-77.
101  This  data  is  froa  Chol  (1988),  p.  11 and  Pyo  (1989),  Table  6.- 10  -
TABLE  3
IN" tJSTRIAL COMPOSITION OF KOREAN
OU3TPUT  - SELECTED YEARS
(Percentage shares in total output)
1970  1975  1980  1983
Agricultur:  17.0  12.8  8.3  8.2
Mining  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.7
Manufacturing  40.3  50.4  51.0  50.0
Light  industry  28.4  29.5  24.7  22.1
Food, beverages  and  tobacco  15.9  14.4  10.8  9.6
Textiles  and  leather  7.1  9.9  8.4  7.0
Lumber  and  wood p.iducts  1.4  1.2  1.0  0.9
Paper  printing  and  publishing  1.4  1.4  1.6  1.8
Nonmetallic metal  manufacturing  1.4  1.5  1.9  1.8
Miscellaneous manufacturing  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0
Heavy  and  chemical  products  11.9  20.9  26.3  27.9
Chemical  and chemical  products  5.9  10.8  12.6  11.8
Primary metal  manufacturing  2.0  3.4  5.1  5.0
Metal  products  and  machinery  4.0  6.7  8.6  11.2
Construction  8.6  6.2  8.0  8.2
Social overhead  6.7  6.7  8.1  8.9
Services  26.3  23.0  23.8  23.9
Source:  World Bank  (1987b),  Tables  1.1 and  1.2.- 11 -
stringent  monetary  and fiscal  measures  as well as new policy  measures  to
promote greater industrial  neutrality.  The underlying  forces that had
prompted  this  new program  were,  however,  strongly  reinforced  in 1979-80  by
a  poor grain harvest, a second oil shock, rising interest rates and
domestic political disturbances.  These events combined to produce a
negative  real  growth  rate  of 4.8  percent  in 1930,  an inflation  rate  of 25.3
percent (as measured  by an increase  i. the GNP deflator)  and a current
account  deficit  at a record  level  of nine percent  of GNP.  The government
thus  began  a  new policy  effort  in 1980,  reflecting  three  goals:  achieving
price  stability;  renewing  rapid economic growth; and  achieving an
improvement  in  income  distribution.  This  strategy  was  reflected  in a range
of stabilization  and adjustment  programs,  which are documented  in Choi
(1988)  and  World  Bank (1987a).
Stringent  monetary and fiscal  policies  were implemented  first.
Once macroeconomic  imbalances  were largely eliminated,  the government
undertook  major trade and financial  reforms.  Average  tariff  rates  were
lowered  from 35 percent  in 1980  to 23.7  percent  in 1983,  and then further
lowered to 12.7 percent by  1988.  Quotas were sharply reduced, and
restrictions  on  direct  foreign  investment  were substantially  relaxed.
Financial  liberalization  measures included  the privatization  of
commercial banks, lower entry barriers in financial  markets, partial
deregulations  of interest  rates  offered  by financial  intermediaries  and  the
abolition  of preferential  loan  policies. A Fair  Trade  and  Antimonopoly  Law
vas  adopted (1981), designed to prevent anticompetitive  practices,  and
strategic promotion of  industries  was replaced by more indirect and
functional  support  for industries  in order to promote  greater  industrial
neutrality.- 12 -
This  stabilization  and  adjustment  program  was  remarkably
successful.  Between  1983  and  1988,  the  rate  of growth  of real  GNP averaged
10.2  percent,  while  domestic  inflation  (GNP  deflator)  averaged  3.8  percent
(compared  to 20.8  percent  during  the  period  1973-79). The  current  account
balance continued  to improve  throughout  the 1980s and reached  a record
surplus  of $14.3  billion  by 1988.11
In 1989,  however,  the  Korean  economy  produced  yet  another  downturn
in growth  performance,  and  there  is  now growing  concern  that  it is heading
into  a further  crisis.1 2 Estimates  for  1989  indicate  that  real  GNP  growth
fell from 12 to 6.7 percent,  the current  account  surplus  fell from $14.2
billion  to $5 billion,  the inflation  rate rose to six  percent  and export
volumes declined  by 6.5 percent,  the first  such decline  since the early
1960s. 13 The  Koreans  believe  that these  dramatic  changes  are  the result
primarily of a sharp deterioration  in Korea's export competitiveness,
caulsed  by the  appreciation  of the  won over  the  past  three  years,  and  social
and political  moves toward  democratization  since  1987  which have prompted
large  wage increases.14
B.  Korean  Tax  Policy  during  the  Growth  Process
Disentangling  the  contribution  of tax  policy  to this  strong  growth
is difficult,  not only because  of the changes  in tax policies  that have
occurred,  but  because  of  the  many  other  factors  that  have influenced  Korean
growth.
11/  This  data  is  from Pyo (1989),  Table  7  and  Oum (1989),  Table  1.
12/  See  Park  (1989),  p.  2.
13/  This  data  is  from Park  (1989),  p.  34,  and  Oum  (1989),  Table  1.
14/ See  Oun  (1989),  p.  13.- 13 -
Korea's  tax system  is composed  of both  national  and local  taxes.
As the  share  of local  taxes  in total  revenues  is small,1 5 we only  discuss
national  taxes.  The importance  of taxes,  measured  by tax revenues  as a
proportion  of GNP, has risen as growth  has occurred  in Korea,  increasing
from 9.1 percent in 1962 to 15.5 percent  in 1987 (see Table 4).  This
growth  in taxes  has  been  uneven,  reflecting  periods  of lower  growth  in the
economy,  as in 1963-65  when revenue  to GNP ratios  fell, and periods  in
which substantial  tax cuts have been used for incentive  purposes,  as in
1972-73.
In 1977,  a VAT  replaced  eight  indirect  taxes  and  has since  become
the single  largest  source  of revenue  in Korea,  accounting  for  25.3  percent
of tax  revenues  in 1987. Since  the  introduction  of the  VAT, indirect  taxes
have increasingly  become the most important  source  cf revenue  in Korea.
The  shares  of direct  and  indirect  taxes  in total  national  revenues  reversed
in importance  from 42.3 percent  and 26.6 percent  respectively  in 1976  to
23.4  percent  and  40.3  percent  in 1987.
C.  Tax  Incentives
Perhaps the most relevant aspect of tax policy in Korea to
evaluating  the  contribution  of tax  policy  to strong  growth  performance  has
been  the  use  of tax  incentives.1 6 These  have  taken  different  forms  in the
three  periods  of growth  outlined  above.
15/ During  the  period  1962-87,  the local  tar  share  ranged  from  8.1  percent  to 17.3  percent.
See  Economic  Planning  Board  (1982,  1988).
161 The discussion  that  follovs  drave  on Westphal  and Kim (1977),  Hong (1979),  Scitovsky
(1985),  World  Bank  (1987a)  and  Choi  (1988).TABLE  4
STRUCRE  OF NATIONAL  TAXES  IN KOREA, 1962-87
As percentage  of total national  taxes
Direct Taxes  Indirect Taxes
National
Special  Taxes as a Income  Corporation Business  VAT Consumption  Liquor Commodity  Stamp Custom  Defense  percentage tax  tax  tax  Others  tax  tax  tax  Others  revenue  duties  surtaxes  of GNP
1962  16.2  7.2  6.9  3.1  - - 8.9  16.7  13.8  2.3  23.9  - 9.1 1963  19.1  9.6  8.2  2.7  - - 8.9  12.1  14.5  2.5  20.5  - 7.1 1964  23.0  11.0  8.6  2.8  - - 7.9  8.8  12.6  2.3  22.0  - 5.9 1965  21.4  10.4  8.0  2.8  - - 6.9  12.9  12.3  1.4  23.0  - 7.2 1966  23.2  12.4  8.3  3.0  - - 7.2  11.8  11.2  1.7  20.1  - 9.2 1967  23.9  12.3  8.9  3.3  - - 6.3  11.9  11.1  1.8  19.7  - 10.9 1968  24.5  12.7  9.0  2.8  - --  5.7  11.4  12.5  1.3  19.5  - 12.7 1969  26.5  12.6  8.8  2.7  - - 6.1  11.7  12.6  1.2  17.0  - 13.3 1970  25.2  12.7  9.3  3.5  - - 6.5  9.5  17.1  4.9  15.2  - 13.1 1971  26.4  13.9  9.3  3.5  - - 6.8  8.6  17.7  0.6  12.8  - 13.3 1972  24.2  12.6  11.2  3.7  - - 6.5  8.5  16.8  1.8  13.6  - 11.4 1973  23.7  9.5  11.5  4.8  - - 6.5  9.6  16.4  1.6  15.8  - 10.8 1974  19.5  13.1  11.5  4.5  - - 6.3  9.4  18.2  1.6  15.0  - 12.1 1975  15.8  10.4  15.8  4.1  - - 6.5  9.4  13.7  1.0  14.4  5.0  13.8 1976  16.7  8.9  13.6  3.0  - - 4.9  8.7  13.0  0.8  14.4  14.0  15.1 1977  14.7  9.8  8.7  0.8  10.1  4.2  5.1  5.0  9.3  0.8  16.1  14.2  14.8 1978  13.9  10.6  - 0.5  24.9  9.7  5.8  0.0  0.7  0.  19.2  14.0  15.3 1979  14.0  11.2  - O.A  24.7  11.0  6.0  - 0.8  0.8  1.6  14.4  15.5 1980  12.5  9.2  - 0.6  27.8  11.0  5.6  - 1.0  0.6  14.5  16.2  15.8 1981  13.5  9.0  - 1.0  27.4  10.!  5.7  - 1.1  0.8  13.5  16.6  16.1 1982  13.2  10.2  - 1.2  27.4  8.7  5.2  - 1.4  0.7  13.3  15.4  16.6 1983  12.3  9.4  - 1.0  27.8  8.6  4.8  - 1.4  0.7  15.9  14.2  17.0 1984  12.2  9.2  - 0.8  26.9  8.9  4.9  - 1.6  0.7  15.9  14.7  16.4 1985  13.4  10.2  - 0.6  26.3  8.9  4.5  - 1.6  0.7  14.2  15.1  16.3 1986  14.1  9.4  - 0.6  25.9  8.6  4.4  - 1.7  0.7  15.4  14.6  16.2 1987  13.6  9.3  - 0.5  25.3  8.8  4.5  - 1.7  0.6  17.0  14.4  15.5
data not applicable.
Sources:  Economic  Planning  Board  (1982,  1988)- 15  -
1961-1972
In the 1960s, the main focus of Korean policy was on export
growth,  which  the  government  of the  day  equated  with nation  building. The
government saw tax incentives  as a way of promoting  growth  of foreign
exchange  earnings,  particularly  from  labor  intensive  exports  in  which  Korea
was believed  to have  a comparative  advantage. The  most prominent  measures
were  those  rebating  indirect taxes on  inputs (whether imported or
domestically  purchased)  into  export  production  and indirect  taxes  on export
sales. 17 These  operated  alongside  tariff  exemptions  on capital  equipment
and  raw  materials  imported  for  export  production.  Beyond  these  were direct
tax exemptions  on income  from  export  business,  and  a 20 percent  exemption
on income  from tourism  and sales  of goods  and services  to U.N. military
forces  in Korea;  although  from 1962  on,  all income  from  activities  earning
foreign  currency  was given  this  same  treatment,  and  the  exemption  rate  was
raised  to 50  percent.
Export*  incentives  also  included  special  depreciation  arrangements,
first  introduced in 1962.  Machinery and equipment used  in export
production  and/or  sales  qualified  for  an  additional  allowance  equivalent  to
30 percent  of the  normal  depreciation  allowance. From 1966  on,  the  scheme
changed  slightly,  making  the allowance  30 percent  if the export  share  of
total  revenues  exceeded  50 percent,  and 15 percent  if the share  was less
than  or equal  to 50 percent. In 1971,  the  formula  for  the latter  case  was
17/  There  is  a  substantial  literature  that  stresses  the  neutrality  for  trade  of  switches
between  origin  (or  production)  based  indirect  taxes  vith  no  border  tax  adjustments,  and
destination  (or  consumption)  based  indirect  taxes  under  which  such  adjustments  occur.
(See  Johnson  and  Krause  (1970)  and  Whalley  (1979)).  ln  Korea,  however,  the  tax  rebate
was  also  seen  as  undoing  existing  export  biases  In  the  policy  structure  as  iuch  as  It
vas  an  explicit  export  incentive.  Thus,  one  can  argue  that  It  had  a  very  favorable
Influence  on  exports.- 16  -
changed  to 30 percent  times  twice  the  share. Machinery  and  equipment  used
by small and medium  sized firms  (SMF's) were  also eligible for an
additional  30 percent  special  depreciation  allowanco  from  1968  onwards.
Whlile  other  features  of the tax regime  in these years  were not
directly tied to trade performance,  they nonetheless  affected  economic
performance  in the trade area.  Tax holidays  had been provided  in Korea
from  1949 onwards  for  selected  industries that were  deemed to be
"important"  for  national  economic  development. Over the years,  these  had
included  ship  building,  machinery,  basic  metal,  petrochemicals  and  chemical
fertilizers.  Typically,  these  were  classified  into  one  of two  groups,  each
with a different  tax  holiday  schedule. The  first  group,  which  included  oil
refining, steel, ship building, iron and steel, copper, cement, and
chemicals,  were eligible  for a complete  tax  holiday  for five  years.  For
the second group, a three year corporate  tax exemption  of 100 percent
applied. Over the  years  minor changes  were made to these  schedules. In
1968,  they  were abolished,  but  the  notion  of using  incentives  for selected
industries  took  root  in the  tax  system.
In 1968, a six percent investment tax credit was  given to
qualified firms operating in selected lndustries.  These were  ship
building, steel and iron, chemical fertilizer,  synthetic  fiber,  autos,
machinery,  straw  pulp,  food processing, petrochemicals, electronic
equipment,  electrical  machinery  and  equipment,  construction  and some  mining
industries. In 1970,  a  6 to 10  percent  investment  tax  credit  was provided
for  investment  in  machinery  and  equipment  in iron  and steel  manufacturing,
with the larger  firms  receiving  the  higher  rate.  Tax incentives  under a
1972 Presidential  Emergency  Decree  also included  a  10 percent  temporary
investment  tax  credit  for  investment using domestic capital goods- 17  -
manufactured  prior to 1975,  and a  40 to 80 percent  special  depreciation
allowance  for fixed  assets  employed  by firms  in selected  industries. From
1970 on, the five-year  tax holiday  with 100 percent  exemption  was only
given  to  selected  petrochemical  industries.
Thus,  the  picture  in the  initial  outward  oriented  phase  of Korean
growth  was of a number  of tax  measures  used  to spur  development,  including
tax  rebates  and  exemptions  for  exports. While  not  necessarily  central,  tax
policy  clearly  played  a role in outward  orientation  and  growth  during  this
period.
1973-1979
In the  early 1970*,  the  Korean  government  began  to scale  down  its
export  promotion  schemes,  and started  giving  higher  priority  to sectoral
development,  focused  primarily  on  heavy  and  chemical  industries.
Indirect  tax  rebates on  exports were  changed in  1977.  A
destination based VAT replaced eight existing indirect taxes, making
rebating  of indirect  taxes  both easier  end  more transparent. The VAT  was
regarded  in Korea  as providing  a simpler  and  more effective  way to rebate
taxes  on  exports  because  exports  are  zero  rated  under  the  VAT.1 8 Indirect
tax refunds  for exports  have sharply  increased  following  the introduction
of the  VAT, in part because  the  tax rate  has increased. For example,  the
indirect  tax refund  as a percent  of export  increased  from six  percent  in
1976  to  nine  percent  in 1978  and  to 10  percent  in 1982.19
18/  One can  argue  that  no  export  subsidy  Is  nvolved  vith  VAT  rebates  on  exports,  since
they  comenesate  for  taxes  on iports  and  have  no  effect  on  trade  flows.  However,
results  fri  Chol  (1984)  ohm  that  the  goverent  had underestSated  the  border  tax
adjustment  under  the  previou  tax ystem.  In  this  sense,  the  adoption  of  the  VAT  had a
poitlve  effect  on trade  flos.
191  Sea  Choi  (1984),  Table  14.  It  appears  that  Chol  hasm  an  error  in  reporting  his
figures,  labelling  thb  as  percentages  rather  than  ratios.- 18 -
There were  also changes in direct taxes and their incentive
features.  In 1973, the 30 percent corporate tax exemption  on export
earnings  was replaced  by two tax free reserve  funds,  one to develop  new
foreigr.  markets and the other to defray export or foreign investment
lossef.  Under  the former,  licensed  exporters  could  deduct  one  percent  of
their foreign exchange earnings from taxable income for deposit in a
reserve  fund.  After a grace  period  of two years,  the amount  was to be
added  evenly  to taxable  income  over the following  three  years.  Under  the
new  export and  foreign investment program, any firm earning foreign
exchange  could deduct  an amount  not exceeding  either  the total  sales in
foreign  exchange  or 50 percent  of total  incomes,  depending  on  which figure
was the lowest,  and, as in the foreign  market  serve  system,  add it back
into  taxable  income  after  a two  year  grace  period. 20
There  were other  changes.  In 1974,  the system  of prior tariff
exemptions  for  capital  equipment  imported  for  export  production  was  changed
to an installment  payment  system.  The tariff  exemptions  on raw  material
inputs  for  export  production  were dropped  in favor  of a drawback  system  in
1975.  Under this system, exporters  were required to pay tariffs  and
indirect  taxes  when importing  their inputs,  but these  were rebated  when
exports  were  actually  shipped  out.
Change  also occurred  in the tax system  outside  the trade based
incentives. In 1974,  a major  reform  replaced  all  major tax incentives  to
key industries  with a "special  tax treatment  for  key industries  program'.
20/ A  further  tax  free  reserve  scheme  was  introduced  later  (1977)  to  deal  with  price
fluctuations.  Any liceneed  exporter  could  deduct  additions  to  a  reserve  fund  froe  Its
tasable  income  within  a  limit  of  five  percent  of  inventory  asset  value,  as  evaluated  at
the  end  of  the  accounting  period.  This  amount  vas  also  added  to  taxable  income  after  a
one  year  grace  period.- 19  -
Under this new system,  eligible  firms in selected  industries  could Bet
either  a tax  holiday  for  five  years,  with 100  percent  tax  exemption  for  the
first  three  years  and  50 percent  exemption  for  the following  two  years,  an
eight  percent  investment  tax  credit  for  machirery  and  equipment  (10  percent
for investments  using  domestic  capital  goods)  or an additional  100  percent
special depreciation  allowance.  Industries  selected  for this treatment
included ship building, naphtha cracking plants, selected  machine and
electronics  manufacturers,  iron and steel, fertilizer,  copper, lead and
zinc  smelting,  selected  mining  and refining  and  electric  power  generation.
Firms in iron and steel,  petrochemicals,  ship building,  chemical  fiber,
chemical  pulp,  marine  food  processing  and  other  food  processing  industries
not qualifying for the three optional benefits  were entitled  to a 60
percent  special depreciation allowance for machinery and  equipment
investment. The special  depreciation  rate for SMF's  was also  raised  from
30 to 50  percent  by the  tax  eform  of 1977.
Thus in the heavy industry  promotion phase of Korean growth,
export  tax incentives  no longer  played a central  role compared  to that
played by  industry  incentive schemes,  whose effect  was to concentrate
Korean  investment over this period on a relatively small number of
industries.
1980-1989
In  1980 and in the face of financial losses and structural
distortions  caused by the HCI drive,  Korea began pursuing  a policy of
structural adjustment and liberalization  that stressed neutrality in
policy.- 20  -
Once  again  changes  In  tax  policy  followed.  Substantial
modifications  were made to the  tea system  in 1981.  Rffective  from 1982,
petrochemicals,  steel,  non-ferrous  metal refining,  chemical  fertilizer  and
power  generation  were excluded  from  the  industry  beneficiary  list.  The  60
percent special depreciation system and the tax holiday option were
terminated  and eligibility  for the special  tax credit  was limited  to the
machinery and electronics  industries.  Also, the tax credit rate was
reduced  to six percent (10  percent  for investment  using  domestic  capital
goods), and then it was  halved to three percent (five percent for
investment  using  domestic  capital  goods)  in 1983.
A  distinctive  feature  of the tax incentives  used In recent  years
is that they are not designed  to affect  the sectoral  structure  of the
economy  but rather  to promote  greater  industrial  neutrality  by correcting
market  failures  or compensating  for them throughout  the  economy. As part
of  its  new  functional  approach,  the  government  has  attempted  to  promote
SMF's,  in  order  to  offset  the  paver  of  conglomerates  and to  speed  the
adoption  of new technologies. Up to 15 percent  of the  book value of the
fixed  business  assets  &t  the end of the  previous  accounting  period  can  be
reserved  as  a  taxable  income  deduction.  If  after  a  four  year  grace  period,
actual  investment  expenditures  exceed  the  reserved  amount,  they are added
evenly  to  taxable  income  over  the  succeeding  three  years.  If,  on  the  other
hand, the reserved amount exceeds actual Investment  expenditures,  the
difference  is  added  to taxable  incom  in  the  fourth  year.
Further new incentives  include  a six  year personal  income tax
exemption  of 100  percent  for  the first  four  years and  50 percent  for the
subsoquent  two  years  for  owners  of newly  established  SMF's  in rural  or sea
districts  in  manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  transportation  or  fishery- 21  -
industries,  and of SNM's organized in technology  intensive  industries.
Furthermore,  newly  organized  SMF'e are given a 50 percent  deduction  from
property  taxes  for  five  years  and  a  50 percent  reduction  in acquisition  and
registration  taxes  for two  years.  Tax incentives  for companies  investing
in newly  organized  SMF's  include  tax free  reserves  for investment  losses,
100  percent  exemption  from  capital  gains  tax and  a special  10  percent  tax
rate  on dividend  income.
D.  Incentive  Effects  of Tax  ArranRements  for  Exports
Establishing  the  exact  incentive  effects  of these  measures  and  how
they  have changed  over  time is difficult. For the  analysis  ve make here,
we draw  heavily  on a recent  study  by Kim (1988)  that estimated  the  export
subsidy  effect  of a range of tax and non-tax  policies  in Korea over the
period 1958-83  (see  Table 5).  We use these  estimates  in our subsequent
model  calculations of the effects of Korean tax policies on outward
orientation  and growth.  Kim included  only those  policies  for  which both
consistent  time series  data were available  and which  were quantitatively
significant. These included  direct  cash subsidies,  exchange  rate  premia,
interest  subsidies,  indirect  tax exemptions,  tariff  exemptions  and direct
tax reductions (exclusive of accelerated  depreciation  provisions and
reserve  funds  both for developing  export  markets  and for  covering  export
losses).
The export  subsidy  effect  of direct  tax  exemptions  was derived  as
the  difference between tax liabilities in the  absence of any  such
exemptions and actual direct tax payments.  The incentive effect of
different interest  rates  was determined  in any analogous  fashion.  The
interest  subsidy  was the  difference  between  the interest  paid at the  non-TABLE 5
ESThAlBS  OP NET AND GROSS EXPORTS SUBSIDIES  PER DOllAR  OF EXPORT FOR KOREA, 1958-1983
(ANNUAL  AVERAGES)
Vaious  expot  subsidies calcuied  per U.S. dollar of  export (won)  Ratio to exchange mte
(percent)
J  ~~~~~~~ofriciai
Year  exchange  Direct  Expt  Direct  Intest  Net  Indirect  Taiff  Grss  Net  Goss
fae  (wonS)  cash  dollar  tax  rae  expt  tax  Rebates  expert  expet  export
subsidies  pemium  reductions  preference  subsidiesa  exempios  for  sbsidies  subsidies  subsidies
for exporters for expes  for expos  exprs
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6=2+3+4+5)  (7)  (8)  (9=6+7+8)  (10=6/1)  (11=9/1)
1958  50.0  0.0  64.0  - 1.2  65.2  - - 652  130.4  130A 1959  50.0  0.0  84.7  - 1.3  86.0  - - 86.0  172.0  172.0
1960  62.5  0.0  83.9  - 1.2  85.1  - - 85.1  136.2  136.2
1961  127.5  7.5  14.6  - 1.0  23.1  - - 23.1  18.1  18.1
1962  130.0  10.3  - 0.6  0.9  11.8  5.1  4.7  21.6  9.1  16.6
1963  130.0  4.1  39.8  0.8  2.9  47.6  5.3  6.6  59.5  36.6  48.8
1964  214.3  2.9  39.7  0.7  6.0  49.3  7.6  10.1  67.0  23.0  31.3
1965  265.4  - - 2.3  7.6  9.9  13.9  15.4  39.2  3.7  14.8
1966  271.3  - - 2.3  10.3  12.5  17.8  21.3  51.6  4.6  *  19.0
1967  270.7  - - 5.2  14.7  20.0  17.8  24.6  62.4  7A  23.1
1e68  276.6  - - 3.0  15.2  18.2  19.9  39.6  77.7  6.6  28.1  s
1969  288.2  - - 3.7  14.7  18.4  27.4  34.3  80.1  6.4  27.8
1970  310.7  - - 3.5  17.3  20.8  27.0  40.4  38.1  6.7  28.4
1971  347.7  - - 4.8  18.1  22.8  32.2  48.0  103.0  6.6  29.6
1972  391.8  - - 1.9  10.5  12.5  26.4  66.3  105.2  3.2  26.9
1973  398.3  - - 1.4  7.4  8.7  21.0  64.4  94.2  2.2  23.7
1974  401.0  - - - 8.6  8.6  22.5  55.1  86.3  2.1  2' 2
1975  484.0  - - - 12.9  12.9  33.8  34.3  81.0  2.7  16.7
1976  484.0  - - - 12.3  12.3  33.6  35.9  81.8  2.5  16.9
1977  484.0  - - - 9A  9.4  53.1  30.6  93.1  1.9  19.2
1978  484.0  - - - 11.0  11.0  53.6  30.0  94.6  2.3  19.5
1979  484.0  - - 11.0  11.0  56.6  30.3  97.9  2.3  20.2
1980  618.5  - - - 20.6  20.6  74.6  36.4  131.6  3.3  21.3
1981  686.0  - - - 15.0  15.0  n.a.  n.a.  na.  2.2  na.
1982  737.7  - - - 3.0  3.0  na.  n.a  n.a.  0.4  na.
1983  781.2  - - - 0.0  0.0  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.0  na.
n.a.:  not available
alotals  may not add up due to rounding enws.
Sourct:  Kim (1988), Table 3.1- 23  -
preferential  commercial  bank lending  rate and the interest  actually  paid.
Similar  calculations  were  made for  the  various  other  tax  and  non-tax  export
incentives.
Several  interesting  observations  flow  from  Table  5.  Exchange  rate
policy, via the foreign exchange premia, played an important role in
stimulating  exports  during  the late 19509  and early 19609,  before  being
changed  in 1965.  Furthermore,  the largest  export  incentives  were during
the  1960s and early  1970s, during which time the effects of export
promotion schemes notably increased.  Beginning in the early 1970s,
however,  the government  tried to reduce  the scope  of  export  incentives.
Kim's estimates clearly show fluctuations  in these subsidies  from 29.6
percent in .972 to a low of 16.7 percent  in 1975 and, with subsequent
rises,  to a high of 21.3  percent  in 1980.  Gross  export  subsidies  in this
data  declined  from 136.2  percent  of the official  exchange  rate in 1960  to
18.1  percent  in 1961  mainly  because  of the  substantial  depreciation  of the
won and  the resulting  rapid  increase  in exports. Net  export  subsidies  per
U.S. dollar  declined  from  23 percent  of the  official  exchange  rate  in 1964
to about four to seven percent during 1965-67,  mainly because  of the
abolition  of the  export/import  link  system.
Table 5 also clearly indicates the growing importance  of tax
policy  as part of the outward  oriented  strategy  of the 1970s.  The  direct
tax  reductions  for  exporters  were consistently  small  and  had  disappeared  by
the early 1970s.  But indirect  tax exemptions  for exporters  grew from
approximately  one third  of gross  export  subsidies  in 1965  to approximately
one half by 1980.  Adoption  of the destination  basis  VAT system  in 1977,
under  which exports  are zero rated,  increased  the border  tax rebates  on
exports sharply  and were included  by Kim (1988)  as part of his export
subsidy  measure.- 24  -
III.  USING A  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUH  MODEL  TO  EVALUATE  THE TAX
CONTRIBUTION TO  OUTWARD ORIENTATION AND GROWTH  IN  THE
EARLY GROWTH  PHASE IN  KOREA
It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  effects  that  the  tax  policy
component of outward oriented policy has had on Korean growth over the last
three decades in a single consistent model framework,  because of the regime
switches and the changes that have occurred in the economy.  Savinga rates
have risen sharply, there has been substantial human capital accumulation,
resources have transferred from the rural to the urban sector and so on.
Therefore, the incentive effects of the various tax schemes used over the
years have come into play on several different  margins, all ef which ought
ideally to be captured in any assessment of the contribution of taxes to
growth.  These include the effects of tax changes on export performance,
savings, investment  and sectoral structure,  among others.
Rather than try to build a comprehensive model from scratch, our
approach  has  been  to use  a model  that we  developed earlier  (Trela and
Whalley (1989)) to analyze the contribution made by intersectoral resource
transfers and by tax incentives to outward orientation and to growth in the
early growth phase in  Korea.  This two sector  model2 l  does not include the
effects of such general factors as savings and human capital, but it does
capture the effects of export promotion on manufacturing, the effects of
tax  policies  on  rural/urban  migration  and, importantly, the endogenous
determination of effort in both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing
sectors.
21/ Our model can be used in higher dimensionality  form.  In part, because of the
complexity  in  implementing  migration  conditions  linking  sectors,  we limit  ourselves  here
to  two  sectors.- 25  -
Relative to other multisectoral modelling efforts that have looked
at growth in Korea and other Asian NICs (see C1  2nery et al. (1986)), this
model  uses  average  product  pricing of  labor in agriculture, reflecting
traditional family farming arrangements.  Decisions regarding effort in all
sectors are  endogenously determined through utility maximizing behavior.
Average product pricing of labor in agriculture, in contrast to marginal
product  pricing  in  manufacturing  sectors,  generates  lower  effort  in
agriculture than in manufacturing, which  is matched by a correspondingly
lower  wage  rate  in  agriculture  than  in  manufacturing.  Promoting
manufacturing  through  exports  thus transfers labor  from the  low effort
agricultural  sector  to  the  high  effort manufacturing  sectors,  thereby
fueling growth.
We have used this model to assess the importance of tax policies
for Korean  growth,  especially  in  the  earlier  phase  (1962-72).  As  we
emphasize  above,  the  second and third phases  of  this period  of  growth
sharply curtailed some of the key features of the outward oriented policies
of the early years.  In addition, many of the features that fostered high
Korean growth are not captured by the  model, such as high savings rates and
rapid human capital accumulation, to  mention but two.
Our modelling strategy is to construct a microconsistent data set
for a given base year to which the model is calibrated.  We then compute
counterfacturals, in which  a new equilibrium for the model  is  found in
which  outward  oriented  policies  (including the tax  elements of  outward
orientation) are removed.  Comparing the two equilibria gives an assessment
of the contribution of outward oriented policies to GDP during the year.
Because of the work involved in constructing base year data sets for each- 26 -
of a series  of years,  we use two alternative  base years  and sequentially
introduce  the  policy  variable  characteristics  of earlier  or later  years  for
comparison  with the  policy  neutral  equilibrium.
Thus,  using  what we term the 1962  base year  model,  we compute  a
policy  neutral  equilibrium  and  then  we compare  sequentially  the 1962  model
with 1962  policies,  with 1963  policies,  with 1964  policies  and so on.  The
policy  contribution  to GDP from  each  year's  policy  regime  is assessed  and
the combined  effect  over 10 (or  20) years  evaluated. We also use a  1982
base year model  in which  earlier policies (1981, 1980, ... )  can be
sequentially  introduced  in the same way.  This procedure  allows  us to
evaluate  the  contribution  of the  tax  component  of outward  oriented  policies
to growth  through  induced  intersectoral  resource  transfers. We are also
able  to evaluate  the contribution  of outward  oriented  policies  in general,
the  specific  indirect  tax  component  of policies  and  the  specific  direct  tax
component  of policies.
In the model, Korea is treated  as a small,  open, price taking
economy.  The resource  endowment  of the economy  comprises  three  primary
factors--capital,  labor  and land.  Only two  of these  appear  as inputs  for
any sector.  The rural sector  uses only land and labor,  while the urban
sector  uses  capital  and  labor. The  effort  supply  of workers  is endogenous;
rural/urban  migration  proceeds  in  response  to differences  in  worker  utility
across  sectors.
Utility  is assumed  to be a positive  function  of consumption  and  a
negative  function  of effort,  with individuals  trading  off differences  in
effort against  differences  in income.  In the rural sector,  employment
means family  members  work not for wages but for an equal share in the
output  of the family  farm.  Workers in the rural sector  thus receive  a- 27 -
return  for  marginal  effort  that is less  than their  marginal  value  product
because of this sharing  rule,  which means that they tend to supply  too
little effort.  Workers in the urban sector are paid their marginal
product,  and hence a reallocation  of labor from the rural to the urban
sector will  typically increase national output, because prospective
migrants  would put forth  greater  effort  in the urban sector  because  they
would be receiving  their full marginal  product.  We  induce  rural/urban
migration  in  the  model  by introducing  policy  incentives  to  promote  exports,
including  tax  policies.
(a) Production
The  two  production  sectors that  appear  in  the  model  are
distinguished  by the types of goods they produce.  The rural sector
specializes  in the production  of a single  agricultural  good (sector/good
1),  while  the  urban  sector  produces  several  manufactured  goods  (sector/good
2).  The output  of each good is produced  according  to a CES production
function:
r  aa-l  a-l laj-l
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where  Qj represents  the  output  of sector  J, 7j is a  constant  defining  units
q
of measurement,  aj is  a share  parameter,  F denotes  the  number  of farms,  ej- 28 -
is the effort of a typical  worker in sector J, L denotes for land used per
farm  in  agriculture,  K  and  Nj  are  capital  and  labor22 and aj  is the
elasticity of substitution  between factor inputs.
On the  factor  side, land and capital are  aesumed to be  sector
specific while  labor is  intersectorally mobile,  although because  of  the
differential effort decision across sectors, wage rates are not equalized
across sectors.  In equilibrium, factors are fully employed:
(3)  L=  L
(4)  K  K
(5)  N =  FN1 +  N2
where L, K and N  define the economy's fixed factor endowments.
Assuming  that urban producers wish  to minimize  their costs and
given that capital supply is fixed, producers in the urban sector choose
the labor input that minimizes their costs:
aW
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where wj  is the price of labor in the urban sector measured in efficiency
units.  This leads to the first order condition:
22/  In  the  agricultural  sector,  Nj  is  labor  per fanm.- 29  -
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where Pj is the price of good j  produced in the urban sector.
The  optimal amount of  labor in the  rural sector  is determined
using the average product pricii  ;  rule for labor:
aj
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where wi is the return to labor in the rural sector.
The return to capital in the urban sector is derived by residual:
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(b)  Consumption
Consumers  are  differentiated  according  to  their  sector  of
residence, although their utility functions defined over goods and effort
(leisure) are the same.  We assume an augmented  CES fcrm:-30-
[  #-1]58-1
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where Xj defines consumption of good J, oj  is a share parameter, 6 is an
elasticity parameter and z >  1 and 6  >  0 are constants, with z measuring
the curvature of the disutility of effort function and 6 defined as a units
term in this sub-function.
Each consumer owns labor and an equal proportion of the economy's
capital endowment  which, along  with transfers, yields consumer incomes.  If
q  N q
T  denotes transfers (recycled  tax revenues) received  by individual q( E  T
q-1
-q  N_q.  q
T  ), K  denotes capital owned by individual  q( E K -K) and Xj are
q=l
purchases of good j  by individual  q, then individual  budget constraints can
be written as follows:
for  workers in the rural sector
2  q  _q  q
(12)  E  PjXj - w1 +  rK +  T
J=1
and for  workers in the urban sector
2  _q  q
(13)  E PjXj - w2c2 +  rK  +  T
J=1
Maximizing (10)  subject to (12) and (13)  yields the demand
functions:- 31 -
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where  I represents  consumer  income.
Substituting  (14)  into  (10)  yields  the  indirect  utility  function:
(15)  U - I C  eZ
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Substituting (7) and  (13) into (15) and optimizing  with respect  to f2
implies  the  optimal  effort  of  a typical  individual  in  the  urban  sector:
I
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Substituting (8) and  (12) into (15) and optimizing  with respect  to el
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(c) Governmen
Government intorventions  in taxes,  subsidios  and transfers  are
also incorporated  In the  model.  The  govornmont  collects  net  revenues  from
the tax subsidy  system  and is assumed  to distribute  them on an equal  per
capita  basis. In the  model,  we only  capture  those  components  of government
revenues  that  are  affected  by taxing  Imports  and  subsidizing  exports.
Revenue  raised  is  thus  given  by:
2  w
(18)  R - EtjPj(Xj  - Qj)
where  Xi and  Qj are  consumption  and  production  respectively,  and tj is the
ad  valorem  tariff  rate  applied  to  import.  of  good  j  evaluated  at  world
V
prices  Pj.  Subsidies  paid  are  thus  given  by:
2  sj  W
(19)  S  - PjQj
'-1  (1-s)
where  sj  is the  subsidy  rate  applied  to production  of good  J.
In setting the parameters  of the modol, we  use estimates of
effective  subsidy  rates In Korea.  Thus neither  rebates  of  indirect  or
direct  taxes  on exports  nor  Import  duty  remiooions  on  exports  are  directly
modelled,  but are  captured  through  the parameter  values  used to represent
trade  taxes  and  export  subsidies.  Those  are  modelled  in  ad  valorem  form.
The  government  not  revenue  T is,  therefore,  given  by:
(20)  T - R - S
The expenditure  side of the government  budget consists  only of
transfers  to households  ms  the government  makes  no  real expenditures  on
goods.  The  government  collects  tariff  revenues,  pays  export  subsidies  and
transfers  its  net revenues  to Individuals  such  that  in equilibrium  its- 33 -
budget is balanced.  If transfers  are made in lump sum form and are
distributed  on an equal  per capita  basis,  then transfers  received  by each
individual  are:
q
(21)  T  - T ,  q =1,  ,N
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(d) Foreign  Sector
A specification  of the external  sector  (rest  of the  world  (ROW))
completes  our model.  The ROW produces  the same number  of good as the
domestic  Korean  economy  and produces  both imports  and  exports  so  that,  in
equilibrium,  it meets  Korean  desired  net trades. Foreign  and  domestically
produced goods are  treated in the model as homogeneous  commodities;
commodities  are  treated  as importables  if  net imports  by  Korea  are  positive
and  as exportables  if  net imports  are  negative.
The model  incorporates an external balance condition which
requires  that  the  value  of imports  equal  the  value  of exports  evaluated  at
world  prices:
2  v
(22)  E Pi(Xj - Qi) =  0
i-1
Korea  is  modelled  as a taker  of  prices  on  world  markets  for  all  tradeables
V
where  Pj denote  the  fixed  world  prices. The  relationship  between  torean
domestic  producer  prices  and  world  prices  for  importables  is:
w
(23)  Pj - Pj(1 +  tj),  j - 1
and  for  exportables  is
w
Pj
(24)  Pj  _  _  ,  j  - 2.
(1-8j)- 34 -
(e)  Equilibrium
We use an iterative  search  procedure  to solve  for  the  equilibrium
combination of rural to urban  employment in the model.  From this,
commodity  demand  and  supplies  are  determined  as are  net  trades. Because  of
the small, open economy assumption,  equilibrium  in the model involves
factor  market  clearing  and  government  budget  balance,  with trade  ba,ance  a
property  of such  an equilibrium.  We begin  by making  an initial  estimate  of
the  wage rate in the  urban  sector  and  of the  return  to labor  in the rural
sector.  We then vary the parameters  until an equilibrium  is found  that
produces  a set  of factor  prices  that  clears  goods  and  factor  markets,  that
holds  external  balance  conditions  and  that  equalizes  utility  across  the  two
sectors.
IV.  USING  THE  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM  MODEL  TO  ANALYZE  THE  ROLE OF
TAX  POLICIES  IN  KOREA'S  OUTWARD  ORIENTED  GROWTH  STRATEGY
We have  used  the model  described  above  in counterfactual
equilibrium  analysis  to assess  the  contribution  of tax  policy  to growth  in
Korea.  As indicated  above,  we calibrate  the model to a microconsistent
data  set for a given  base  year incorporating  a number  of outward  oriented
growth  policies  used  in that  year,  including  tax  policies. Because  of data
difficulties,  we have built  data sets  for two  years  only, 1962  and 1982,
representing  recent  and  early  years  in  Korea's  growth  process. This  yields
two  alternative  models,  a 1962  and  a 1982  base  year  model.
Using  each  base  year  model,  we perform  a series  of counterfactual
equilibrium  calculations.  First,  we remove  the  export  subsidy  component  of
the policy  mix used in the base year, yielding  what we term an "export
policy  neutral  equilibrium"  (in  other  words,  tariffs  remain  present). This- 35  -
enables  us to assess  the  contribution  to Korean  growth  of policies  pursued
in the  base  year.  The  contribution  to growth  of policies  pursued  in other
years  is  evaluated  by introducing  the  policies  of the  alternative  year into
the model  in place of the base year policies and computing a new
equilibrium  in the presence of each.  Comparison  between each of the
equilibria  and the policy neutral equilibrium  then provides  the model
estimates  of the year's  policy  contributiorn  to growth  in the year.  The
effects  of policies  over  a number  of years  are  evaluated  as the  sum  of the
individual  year's  effects.
We have performed  these  calculations  using  both the 1962  and 1982
base year models;  different  results  are obtained  in each case, depending
upon the choice of base year model.  We also perform  calculations  for
different types of policy evaluation, for a removal of all  export
subsidies,  for  the  tax  component  alone  and  for  the  direct  (or  indirect)  tax
component.
Calibration
Parameter  values for the production  and demand  functions  in the
model  are determined by using calibration techniques.  Calibration
procedures  that  are  widely  used  in  other  applied  general  equilibrium  models
are followed  (see Mansur  and Whalley  (1984)).  The requirement  for
parameter  values chosen in this way is that they should  be capable  of
replicating  the base year microconsistent  data set as an equilibrium
solution to the model, given extraneous  estimates of elasticities  of
substitution,  policy  parameters,  endowments  and  other  data.- 36 -
The first step in calibration  is to break down the base yeab
microconsuitent  data,  constructed  in value  terms,  into  separate  price  and
quantity  data.  For this  purpose,  a unit's  convention  is adopted  (also  see
Mansur  and Whalley  (1984))  that defines  physical  units for  commodities  as
those  amounts  that  sell  for  one  currency  unit ($1.00  U.S.). 23 For  factors,
baes year equilibrium  data  on the price  of capital,  labor  employment,  and
urban/rural  earnings  differentials  are  used to decompose  capital  and  labor
payments  into  separate  price  and  quantity  observations.
The share  parameters  for the  demand  and  production  functions  can
then  be determined  by calibration,  dependant  upon the  choice  of elasticity
values  for  the  production  and  utility  functions  in  the  model. In the  rural
sector,  the values  of the share  parameter  aj are taken from the average
product  pricing rule for labor and from the first order condition  from
producer  cost  o.limization  in  the  urban  sector.
These  ares
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23/  The  1962  and 1982  benchmark  data  on production  and  labor  income  in  won  are  converted
Into  U.S.  dollar  using  offlcial  exchange  rates  from  the  Economic  Planning  Board  (1964,
1984). Trade  data  for  both  years  are  reported  in  U.S.  dollars.- 37  -
e1, the  units  term in the  production  function,  is  arblitrarily  set  equal  to
one allowing  equation  (25)  to be solved  for  al.  The value  for  72 is then
derived  by residual  using equation  (9), given  the units'  definitioa  for
output.
Demand side parameters  are determined  In an analogous  fashion
using calibration techziques,  except  that first  order conditions for
utility  maximization  are  used.  Taking  the  derivative  of (10)  with respect
to Kj  yields:
pj  Pi  fXjl  L
(27)  - _  j  ,  j  - 1,2,  k  - 1,2,
Pk  Pk LxkJ
2
Normalizing  so that  E  j  - 1, individual  values  can  be obtained.
i-1
Because  £2  can  be arbitrarily  set  equal  to one  in  the  base  case  data,  the
value  for 6  can  be derived  from (16).  l  can  then  be determined  directly
from  the  equal  utility  condition  linking  the  manufacturing  and  agricultural
sectors.
The  microconsistent  data sets  to  which  we calibrate  our  model are
built  for  the two  years  of 1962  and 1982,  each  chosen  to reflect  different
stages  of Korean  growth. One is largely  pro-outward  orientation,  and the
other  post-outward  orientation  and  for  a more  recent  year.  In  constructing
these  data  sets,  different  basic  data  sources  have  been  used  and  various
incompatibilities  between  source  materials  have  had to be dealt  with.
Adjustments  have  been  made  to  the  data,  both  to  resolve  incompatibilities
(differences  in  definition,  end  measuremnt  differences)  end  to  ensure  that
the  equilibrium  conditions  of  the  model  are  satisfied  in  the  data.- 38 -
Data on the income  of urban  wage earners  ror  both years is from
the  Economic  Planning  Board  (1964,  1984). The  urban  wage rate (in  terms  of
efficiency  units) is calculated  by dividing  the urban wage bill by the
product of the number of employed  persons in the urban sector and the
effort  level  of a typical  worker  in this sector,  which is arbitrarily  set
equal  to 1.0  in the  base case equilibrium  data.  Data on urban  employment
for  both  years  is also  from  the  Economic  Planning  Board  (1964,  1984). The
average farm income per worker is estimated  using data on urban/rural
differences  in earnings  taken  from  Hong (1979). Since  the data from  Hong
are only available  up to 1976,  we use the 1976  data  and assume  that they
also  reflect  urban/rural  differences  in earnings  in 1982.  The  rural  wage
bill is estimated  as the  product  of average  farm  income  per  worker  and  the
number  of persons  employed  in the rural  sector. Data  on rural  employment
in  each  year is from  Economic  Planning  Board  (1982,  1986).
The income  return  to capital  in the  urban  sector  is estimated  as
the residual  of the  value of production  less labor  income.  To translate
this into an observation  on the physical quantity of capital  used in
determining  parameters  in the  model,  an estimate  of the rate of return  on
capital  in manufacturing  is needed. We use estimates  on average  rates  of
return  on capital  during  1954-61  and  1972-'5  (the  last  period  available  to
us) from  Hong (1979)  and  assume  them to  be roughly  equivalent  to the  rates
in 1962  and  1982.- 39 -
Data on the  value of production  and  net trade 24 by commodity  for
each  year are from  the  Economic  Planning  Board (1964,  1984)  except  for  data
on agricultural  production,  vhich from our model definition is equal to
labor income  from employment  in the rural  sector.  For each c  omodity,  the
value of consumption  is determined as the residual  between the value of
production  and trade.  The value of trade  evaluated  at  world prices  must,
fcr general  equilibrium  consistency,  satisfy  trade balance,  and a sc'.ing
procedure  incorporating  the import data is used to ensure that condition
holds.
The model  also requires elasticity values  for production and
demand functions.  We  use values of  1.5 and -1.5.  The unobservable
parameter z, which measures  the curvature of the utility function,  we
assume to be  1.5.  Because of the potentially  crucial nature of these
values  for  model  behavior,  we use these  values  as our  central  set  of  values
around  which sensitivity  analyses  are  performed.
To incorporate  outward oriented  growth policies into the model,
data  are also  required  on tariffs  and  export  subsidies. Since agriculture
is the only good that is imported  in our model,  we need tariff  rates only
on this product.  We  use the weighted average tariff rate on primary
products (adjusted  for rebates)  in 1968 (the  earliest  period available  to
us) from  Westphal and  Kim (1977)  and assume  it to be be roughly  equivalent
to the tariff rate in 1962.  For tariff rates in 1982,  we use a simple
average tariff rate on live animals and vegetable  products in 1982 from
World  Bank (1987a).
241  Korea was  a  net  Importer  of  manufacturing  goods in  both  1962 and  1982 and is  treated  as
a  net  exporter  of  manufacturing  goods in  the  model.  We  make the  strong  assumption  that
net  exports  of  manufacturing  goods  in  1982 are  given  not  by  net  trade  in  total
manufacturing  goods  but  rather  in  specific  aggregate  categories  (consumpt:on  and
investment  goods)  of  vhich  Korea was a  net  exporter  in  1982.  In  1962, Korea was  a  net
Importer  in  all  specific  aggregate  categories  (consumption, investment  and  raw material
goods).  Therefore,  we use  1982 export  data  on the  composition  of  trade  to  produce  our
1962 microconsistent  data  set.- 40  -
Data on subsidy  rates  are  taken  from  Table  5, which  we reproduced
from Kim (1988).  Since 1980 is the  most recent  year for  which detailed
information  on subsidy  rates  from  this  source  is available,  we use  the 1980
data and assume  it to be roughly  equivalent  to the rates  in both 1981  and
1982.
Table  6 reports  some summary  statistics  from  the  two  data sets  we
have  constructed. The  rapid  expansion  in  the  economy  between  1962  and 1982
is evident,  as is the change  in the industrial  composition  of employment
and output,  and the changes  in importance  of trade  to the  economy.  What
remains  to  be established  is  how  significant  tax  policies  were in  promoting
outward orientation  and how great a contribution  they made to Korea's
strong  growth  performance.
V.  RESULTS
We have used the general equilibrium  model described  above to
assess  the contribution  of tax policies  to Korean  growth  as part of the
outward  oriented  growth  strategies  used  in recent  decades.  The
counterfactual  policy exercises  we have performed  involved  a series  of
counterfactual  experiments  in  which the  base year (1962  or 1982)  policies
are removed,  and a new equilibrium  for the  model is computed  and compared
to the benchmark equilibrium.  This  comparison yields estimates of
quantitative  changes  in all  the  endogenous  model  variables  under  the  policy
change.  Further counterfactual  experiments  are then performed  in which
outward oriented tax policies during each year of the specified time
periods (1963-82,  1963-72  or 1981-62)  are sequentially  introduced.  For
each  of these  policy  changes,  a new  counterfactual  equilibrium  is computed
and  compared  with the  same  no policy  equilibrium.- 41  -
TABLE  6
SUMMARY  FEATURES  OF 1962  AND 1982  MICROCONSISTENT  DATA SETS
USED  TO EVALUATE  INPUTS  OF TAX POUCIES  IN KOREA'S
OUTWARD  ORIENTED  GROWTM  STRATEGY
1962  Microconsistent  1982  Microconsistent
Data Set  Data Set
Value of GDP
(millions  U.S. dollars)  1935.59  92587.56
Ratio of employment
in manufacturing
to agriculture  1:15  1:2
% of GDP in
importsa  16.0  43.9
exportsa  6.0  36.9
Manufactured  exports
as % total exportsb  27.0  93.7
Average  tariff rate
on imports  (%)  13.4  7.09
Average  export subsidy
rate (%)  16.6  21.3
Notes: a)  The numbers  used in the model  are smaller  due to netting out of two-way trade.
b)  These figures  are based on actual data. In the model Korea  only exports  one
manufactured  good on a net basis.- 42 -
The  sum  of the  effects  from  each  of the  experiments  across  each  of
the  years  during  the 1962-82  period  are reported  in Table  7.  The  average
annual increase  in GDP over this period that can be attributed  to tax
policies  is small,  only  0.54  percent  using  the  1982  base  year  model  or less
than 10 percent  of actual  average  annual  Korean  growth  in real GDP.  A
similar  result  is reached  with each  of the other  model experiments,  which
use the 1962 base year model.  These results  suggest  that tax policies
played  only  a  minor  role  in  Korea's  outward  oriented  developmental  process,
even in the  early  phases  of Korean  growth  (1962-72). These  policies  also
clearly  had the effect  of inducing  migration  from the rural  to the urban
sector. The  effect  of removing  1982  tax  policies  using  the 1982  base  year
model shows the share of labor in agriculture  as increasing  to 70.63
percent  from  its 1982  benchmark  level  of 67.35  percent,  while  the share  of
labor  employed  in manufacturing  falls  from 32.67  to 29.37  percent. Also,
these policies  caused  exports  of manufacturing  goods to expand  by 1.07
percent  on an annual  basis  over  the  20  year  period.
Using  the  same  modelling  approach,  the  relatively  small
contribution  of tax policies  to growth  can also be broken  down into two
separate  effects--direct  tax reductions  (mainly  corporate  tax rebates  for
exporters)  and indirect  tax  exemptions  (rebates  of sales  and excise  taxes
on exports). These  results  are  reported  in  Table  8.  Results  indicate  that
indirect  tax exemptions  have contributed  far more to Korean  growth than
have direct  tax  measures,  which  have  been  relatively  inconsequential.
Table  8 also  shows  the  results  of a  model  experiment  in  which  both
the  tah  and  non-tax  components  of outward  oriented  Korean  growth  strategies
are removed.  The quantitative  magnitudes  involved  emphasize  the dominant
role  that  non-tax  components  (tariff  rebates,  interest  preferences,  directAL  A  I  I
OF KOREAN TAX POIUCIES 196282
Contribution  over  Contribution  over  Contribudon  over
20 years of outward  20 years of outward  10 years  of outward  Actual  average
oriented  tax policies  oriented  tax policies  oriented  tax policies  annual  growth
using 1982  base model  using 1962  base model  using 1962  base model  rate
1962-82  1962-72
Annual  Average
Growth  Rate (%)
GDP  0.54  0.68  0.62  8.65  9.25
Exports  o,
Manufactures  using
1982  base modeld  1.07  n.a.  n.a.  35.37  55.66
Imports  of
Agriculture  using
d  1.94~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a  a15 1982  base modeld  1.10  n.a.  n.a.  11.94  21.58
1982  base  1962  base
1982  base  year model  1962  base  year mudel
year model  with tax  year model  with tax  Actual
with 1982  policy  with 1962  policy  Distributionb
policies  neutral  mix  policies  neutral  mix  1962c  1972  1982
Distribution
of Employment  (%)
Agriculture  67.35  70i.63  93.73  94.16  63.1  50.6  32.1
Manufacturing  32.67  29.37  6.21  5.84  36.9  49.4  67.9
Notes:  aFigures  are based on imports  of food and live animals.
bThe distribution  is between  agriculture  and nonagriculture.
CBased  on the 1963  distribution.
dTrade growth  using  the 1962  base model  are unrealistically  high  because  of the small
manufactured  export  base involved,  and are not reported.TABLE 8
ASSESSING  THE EFFECUS  OF TAX POUCES ON KOREAN
GROWTH USIG  THE 1982 BASE MODEL
Contribution  of  Contribution  of  Contribution  of  Contribution  of
indirect  tax  direct tax  combined  tax  both tax and non-tx
component  of  component  of  component  of  com'rponents  of
outward  oriented  outward  oriented  outward  oriented  outward  oriented  Acual average
Korean  growth  Korean  growth  Korean  growth  Korean  growth  amnual  growth
stlategy  strategy  strategy  strategy  rates
Annual  Aveage
Growth  Rate (%)
GDP  0.51  0.03  0.54  1.40  8.65
Exrs  of
Manufictures  1.01  0.07  1.07  2.64  35.37
Imports  of
Agriculure  1.04  0.07  1.10  2.66  11 9a
1982  base
year  model
without  1982  base
1982  base  1982  year  model  1982  base  1982  base
year  model  indirect  without  1982  year  model  year  model  Actual
with 1982  tax  direct  tax  with  tax policy  with  export  policy  Distnbutionb
policies  policies  policies  neutral  mix  neutral  mix  1962c  1982
Distribution
of Employment  (%)
Agriculture  67.35  70.63  67.32  70.63  73.27  63.1  50.6
Manufacturing  32.67  29.37  32.68  29.37  26.73  36.9  49.4
Notes:  8F*umus  are  based  on imports  of food  and live animals
blbe distribution  is between  agriculture  and  nonagriculture.
cBased  on the 1963  distribution.- 45 -
cash subsidies and export premia) have played in Korea's development
process. Overall,  however,  the  results  seem  to imply  that  outward  oriented
policies  in  Korea  have  had little  significance  in  promoting  growth. 25
Table  9 reports  on  the sensitivity  of these  results  to certain  key
model  parameters.  Three sets of parameters are varied--demand and
production function elasticities and  the utility function curvation
parameter that affects effort decisions.  Table 9 suggests  that model
results  are  sensitive  to  the values  chcsen  for  the  substitution
elasticities in production, but  less to the other model  parameters
examined.  The importance  of production  side elasticities  is that their
values  affect  the  slope  of the  marginal  value  product  of labor  schedules  in
the two sectors,  and hence the size of intersectoral  resource  transfers
associated  with alternative  policies.  Even with this sensitivity  of
results,  however,  the quantitative  magnitudes  that emerge  still indicate
that the main factors underlying Korean growth in recent decades lie
outside  of tax  policy.
VI.  CONCLUSION
This  paper discusses  and evaluates  the role of tax  policy  in the
Korean  growth  process  from the  early  1960s  to the  late 1980s. As such,  it
seeks to do two things:  (i) to document  and describe  the evolution  of
25/  A recent  study,  Chenery  et al. (1986),  also  uses  a multisectoral  general  equilibrium
model  for  analyzing  the  contribution  of  trade  policy  to  growth  in  Korea.  The  results  of
their  model simulations  indicate  that  outward  oriented  policies  account  for  as  much as
one  percent  of output  growth  in Korea. Our  results  indicate  a somewhat  larger
contribution  to  growth.  However,  our  model  only  provides  a  very  partial  view  of  the
Korean  growth  process,  as  savings,  investment,  human  capital  formation  and  many  other
factors  are  missing.TABLE 9
SENSrrIVrTY ANALYSIS  OF ASSESSMENTS  OF THE CONTRIBUTION
OF TAX POLICIES  TO KOREAN  GROWTH  USING THE 1982 BASE MODEL
Assesnent  as  As in Table 7,  As in Table 7,  As in  Table 7,
in  Table 7  but with  but with  but with the
substitution  substitution  utility function
elasticities  elasticities  curvature
in  production  set  in consumption  set  parameter, z,  Actual annual
equal to 0.75  equal to -0.75  set equal to 2.50  growth rate
Average Annual
Growth Rate
GDP  0.54  0.24  0.54  0.54  8.65
Exports of Manufacturers  1.07  1.57  1.06  1.06  35.37
Imports of Agiculture  1.10  1.60  1.10  1.10  11.94a
1982 base  1982 base  1982 base  1982 base  1982 base  Actual Distributionb
year model  year model  year model  year model  year model  1962c  1982
with 1982  with tax  with tax  with tax  with tax
policies  policy  policy  policy  policy
neutral mix  neutral mix  neutral mix  neutral mix
Distribution  of
Employment  (%)
Agriculture  67.35  70.63  69.42  70.63  70.63  63.1  50.6
Manufacturing  32.67  29.37  30.58  29.37  29.37  36.9  49.4
Notes:  aFigures  are based on imports  of food and live animals.
bThe distribution  is between  agriculture  and nonagriculture.
CBased on the  1963 distribution.- 47 -
Korean  tax policies  over this development&.  sequence;  and (ii) to use a
general  equilibrium  model developed  earlier  by the authors  to provide  an
initial quantitative  assessment  of the role that tax policies  may have
played  in this  growth.
What  emerges  from  the  first  section  of the  paper  is  a picture  of a
tax system  in Korea that has evolved  over nearly  30 years from a system
raising  small  amounts  of revenue  from  a series  of narrowly  based  taxes  to a
more broadly  based,  mature  system  raising  more revenue  that  relies  heavily
on a broadly  based  VAT.  Throughout  this  period,  the  Korean  tax  system  has
also been remarkably  adept  in responding  to the various  svings  in Korean
growth policies.  In the outward oriented  phase (1961-71),  rebates  of
direct  and indirect  taxes  on exports  were used; in the  heavy  and chemical
industry  phase (1973-79)  investment  tax credits,  tax holidays  and other
incentives  for these industries  were used; and in the most recent  trade
liberalization  and  structural  adjustment  phase (1980-89),  neutrality  in tax
policy  has  been the  approach. The  GDP growth  rate in each  of these  phases
has been consistently  high,  which implies  that  the changing  tax system  in
Korea  has  probably  facilitated  rather  than  fueled  high  growth.
In the second  part of the paper,  we use a general  equilibrium
model (Trela  and  Whalley (1989))  that  we have already  used on a previous
occasion  to  investigate the  significance of intersectoral resource
transfers  for  Korean  growth  and  to assess  the  contribution  of tax  policy  in
Korea.  This  model  provides  only a very partial  view of the  Korean  growth
process,  as savings,  investment,  human  capital  formulation  and many other
key  factors  are  missing. But  unlike  earlier  modelling  efforts,  this  uses  a
structure in which agriculture  is represented  by traditional farming
patterns  with an equal  sharing  of the  proceeds  between  farm  members. As a- 48  -
result,  effort  levels  In  agriculture  are  lower  than  in  manufacturing  which
has  marginal  product  pricing  of  labor,  with  an  accompanying  differential
betveen  the urban  wage and (implicit)  rural  wage.  Ixport  promotion
policies,  which  stimulate  manufacturing,  move  labor  from  the  low  efficieey
rural  sector  to  the  high  efficiency  urban  sector.
Using  this  model  to examine  the contribution  of tax  orvintcd
policie  in  the  earlier  years of Korean  growth  semem  to  indicato  a
relatively  modest  role  for  taxes,  accounting  for  less  than  10  perceat  of
actual  Korean  growth  over  the  period  1962-82  and  over  the  lntonsive  outward
oriented  phase  of  1962-72.  However,  around  three  percent  of  export  growth
can  be  attributed  to  these  policies.- 49  -
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